Publisher's Synopsis
The issues relating to concept of action, freedom and responsibility has been a problem for all philosophers. This is a problem that relates a man in his life-situation. Free-will or free-choice defines action. The objective of this work is to understand the issues pertaining to action, freedom and responsibility. It also tries to reconstruct the metaphysical presuppositions and ethical corollaries of the philosophy of action. The concept of action is focal point of analysis in morality. The notions of rational deliberation, free-will, responsibility are meaningful in relation to action. To say that human actions are willed or volitional is to say the half-truth. Animal behaviour can also said to be willed, but will in this sense is not necessarily a rational activity. Human actions are volitional in the specific sense of the term i.e., the willing is not a blind caprice or of the nature of instinctive prompting but is backed by rational deliberation. There is always scope for subjecting human action to moral valuation because there is alternative course of action leading to alternative set of consequences open before the agent. Since it is assumed that the moral action is not coerced to what he does, he owns the action and thereby the consequences of action. So agent will be held responsible only when he understands the situation, does not take any alternative course of action whimsically and consents to such course of action.
