Hierarchy and Flexibility in World Politics Adaptation to Shifting Power Distributions in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund

This book develops a theory of international stability which it tests, with positive results, on two of the important institutions of contemporary world politics - the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund. It shows that states care passionately about their relative positions in important hierarchies of influence and that the ability of such hierarchies to adapt in line with shifts in the international distribution of power is vital to the overall stability of the international system. The book emphasizes the central role played by institutional design in determining the relative flexibility or rigidity of hierarchies of influence: even in technical issue-areas, such as that occupied by the IMF, where relative capabilities of states and changes thereof, may be quite easily measured. The book thus transcends the question of whether institutions matter in world politics. While it clearly demonstrates that they do matter, it shows that institutions may both contribute to and detract from international stability.