Publisher's Synopsis
COIN - counterinsurgency - is a major element in international relations - both historical and 'IR theory' - and in military history. It was a vital component in the Cold War and decolonisation. COIN is now widely contrasted with 'Big War' theory in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war and proxy-war with NATO, but is still a global phenomenon. Dhofar as a mis-ruled province of 'medieval' Oman, saw insurgency initiated by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) and its successors organizations including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). These were supported variously by China, the USSR and other Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Iraq, but the insurgency was defeated by a combination Omani, British, Iranian and Jordanian forces. The COIN win in Dhofar prevented the spread of Communism on the Arabian Peninsula, thereby protecting British Middle Eastern influence and the vital Gulf oil supply to both the UK and wider Western economic bloc. The war and associated counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign can be considered a unique or 'sui generis' military 'success', with revolutionary forces overcome in a difficult and often brutal campaign involving British forces including its elite SAS Regiment, along with Jordanian and Iranian military aid. The study covers much more than the Dhofar campaign and contrasts the Omani example with other British COIN operations in major decolonising territories and 'Emergencies' (1945-1999). These include the campaigns undertaken in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Brunei/Borneo, Aden and Northern Ireland; which highlight the many similar aspects of these examples shared with the Dhofar War, but also that its unique status in the British COIN historiography should be acknowledged.
