Publisher's Synopsis
Professor Alexander addresses the problem of personal identity by investigating the self in terms of its ontological nature and its relationship to time. He argues that the prominent philosophical treatments of personal identity have erroneously focused on the first-level physical properties and/or on the second-level psychological properties of human individuals. In both cases, it is extremely doubtful that the concept of personal identity can be defended. Nevertheless, the concept continues to be a popular presupposition in the task of identifying individuals in interpersonal relations, legal matters, religious concerns, etc. It is obvious that generations of reductivists have not eradicated the concept. In order to account for the continued use of the concept, Professor Alexander treats the self as a supervenient property of both the physical and psychological properties and, more specifically, as an abstract particular. The self is more akin to a ?pattern? or configuration of the individual that is an outcome of both an individual?s decisions and the relations existing between the individual and his/her society. The self is not to be confused with the individual?s consciousness, but is used by an individual?s consciousness in making decisions and is the basis for one?s ?self-image? or ?self-understanding?.
