Publisher's Synopsis
Of course, philosophy uses language and must do so. But it has always been assumed that language is merely a vehicle for making public one's insights into reality, that it is, as it were, a transparent medium through which others may come to see what one has seen. This is our traditional assumption about language. Of course, philosophy is rational and must be so. The philosopher is supposed to be detached and objective. As a philosopher, one's interest is purely speculative, certainly not practical. This is our traditional assumption about philosophy. But what if we are wrong in these assumptions? What if language enshrines an ontology of its own so that when we speak, we impose a structure on reality that is not its structure? Suppose the philosopher is deluded in thinking that s/he is detached? Suppose the intellect itself constitutes a point of view on reality that is not fundamentally speculative but practical? It is to the overthrow of these traditional assumptions about language and philosophy that Bergson's irrationalist metaphysics is directed. But now we enter a conceptual field riddled by paradox. Given that philosophy is essentially rational discourse, any attempt on the part of a philosophical theory to discredit rationality and/or discourse will be self-referential, that is, its criticisms will apply to itself. If it is true, it will be false. Whatever is spoken, cannot be said. The aim of this book is to address Bergson's irrationalist metaphysic as a philosophical theory that appears to entail its own invalidation. It is to lay bare the structure of arguments that seem to be hopelessly self-refuting. And it is to show the intelligibility of initially unintelligible claims.
